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1 Introduction
Models of risk averse decision-makers are applied in a wide variety of contexts. For example,
expected utility models have recently been applied in research on principle-agent theory (Chade
and de Serio 2002), risk aversion and prudence (Lajeri and Nielsen 2000; Eichner and Wagner
2003), bounds on utility (LiCalzi 2000; Zambrano 2008), non-location scale distributions (Boyle
and Conniffe 2008), and frequentist perspective (Hu 2009). Rank dependent models have
recently been applied to research on savings decisions (Bleichrodt and Eeckhoudt 2005),
monotone risk aversion (Chateauneuf, Cohen and Meilijson 2005), and medical insurance (Ryan
and Vaithianathan 2003). Dual theory of expected utility and cumulative prospect theory have,
respectively, recently been applied in research on incomplete preferences (Maccheroni 2004) and
the St. Petersburg paradox (Rieger and Wang 2006). Our paper reports research on internal
coherence problems that can arise in applications of such models.
Models of decision under risk represent risk preferences with utility functionals that are
nonlinear in payoffs or nonlinear in probabilities or nonlinear in both. For example, expected
utility theory represents risk aversion with concave utility of payoffs. The dual theory of
expected utility (Yaari 1987) represents risk aversion with convex transformation of
decumulative probabilities. Rank dependent utility theory (Quiggin 1993) and cumulative
prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman 1992) represent risk attitudes with nonlinear
transformations of both payoffs and probabilities. The nonlinear transformations suggest
questions about the internal coherence of the theoretical models.
Rabin (2000) demonstrated how modeling risk aversion with concave utility of payoffs can
fail to provide a coherent theory of both small-stakes risk aversion and large-stakes risk
aversion.1 Although Rabin’s statement of the critique applies only to the expected utility of
terminal wealth model, subsequent authors extended this payoffs calibration critique to a class of
theories of decision under risk that have utility functionals that are nonlinear in payoffs. 2 But the
payoffs calibration arguments have no implications for nonlinear transformations of
probabilities, which is an alternative way to model risk aversion. Sadiraj (2012) presents a
probabilities calibration that demonstrates the implausible implications of nonlinear
1

See Hansson (1988) for an earlier critique of expected utility theory with similar arguments.
Several studies report payoffs calibration patterns that apply to models defined on (a) terminal wealth or (b)
income. Studies that focus on terminal wealth models include Hansson (1988), Rabin (2000), Neilson (2001), and
Safra and Segal (2008, 2009). Varying-payoffs calibrations for models defined on income are reported by Barberis,
Huang, and Thaler (2006), Cox and Sadiraj (2006), and Rubinstein (2006).
2
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transformation of probabilities. Each of the distinct types of calibration (of nonlinear payoffs
transformation or nonlinear probabilities transformation) by itself has implications of implausible
risk aversion for theories of decision under risk that transform both payoffs and probabilities.
Together, the payoffs calibrations and the probabilities calibrations provide an answer to a
central question raised by the calibration literature: What would be the characteristics of a theory
of risk-avoiding behavior that is immune to both payoffs calibration and probabilities calibration
arguments? This paper offers insights into answering this question with an analysis of decision
theories based on duality. We show that the payoffs calibration patterns conform to the linearity
in payoffs property of the utility functional for the dual theory of expected utility (Yaari 1987).
In contrast, the probabilities calibration patterns conform to the linearity in probabilities property
of the utility functional for expected utility theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1947). Our
dual analysis reveals that Sadiraj’s (2012) probabilities calibration patterns, together with
Rabin’s (2000) payoffs calibration patterns, provide an answer to the central question about the
properties that would characterize a theory of risk-avoiding preferences that would not be called
into question by calibration critique. A theory of risk preferences with functional that is linear in
probabilities would be immune to the probabilities calibration critique. A theory of risk
preferences with functional that is linear in payoffs or assumes variable reference payoffs would
be immune to the payoffs calibration critique. Hence a theoretical model characterized by
linearity in probabilities and variable reference payoffs would be immune to both of the dual
calibration critiques. A version of the vintage model in Markowitz (1952) has the requisite
properties to survive the dual critiques unscathed. In contrast, currently popular models are
vulnerable to one or both types of calibration critique.
The fundamentality of the calibration literature ultimately rests on empirical validity of the
patterns of risk aversion supposed in the two types of calibration propositions. To date, however,
there has been argument about the “reasonableness” of calibration suppositions but no data from
real-payoff, controlled experiments to inform the issue. This paper reports several experiments
conducted in three countries (India, Germany, and the United States) with idiosyncratic
opportunities for implementing a variety of experimental designs and protocols covering both
payoffs calibration patterns and probabilities calibration patterns that, together, have broad
implications for plausibility of theories of decision under risk.
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2 Dual Calibration Patterns and Dual Paradoxes
For any given integer m, let I m denote the set of positive integers not larger than m, that is
I m  {1, 2,

, m}. Let { yk , pk }kIm denote an m-outcome lottery, L that pays yk with probability

pk , k  I m , where

m

p
k 1

k

 1. We use the convention y j 1  y j , for j  I m1. Whenever the

smallest payoff is zero (i.e., y1  0 ), we use the simpler notation { ym , pm ;...; y2 , p2} .
In this paper we focus on a class of theories of decision under risk that includes all of the
more prominent ones. The most familiar such theory is expected utility theory (EU) which
represents the utility of a lottery, L  { yk , pk }kIm with the functional
m

U ( L)   v( yk ) pk ,

(EU-1)

k 1

where v() is a continuous positively-monotonic function that transforms payoffs. As is well
known, EU represents risk aversion solely by concavity of the utility function v() . The
distinguishing property of functional (EU-1) is its linearity in probabilities, which follows from
the Independence Axiom.3 With the terminal wealth model of EU, v( yk )  u(w  yk ), k  I m ,
where w is the amount of initial wealth, whereas in case of the income model of EU the utility
function v() is invariant to w .
In order to facilitate exposition of less familiar models, we will first rewrite (EU-1) in an
alternative, logically equivalent form. Let Pk , k  I m denote the (decumulative) probability that
m

the lottery L pays yk or more, that is Pk   pi , k  I m . Using this notation, (EU-1) can be
i k

rewritten as
m 1

(EU-2)

U ( L)  v( ym ) Pm   v( yk )[ Pk  Pk 1 ] .
k 1

3

This axiom was introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947). The statement of the axiom by Yaari (1987,
pp.98) is: (IA) For all lotteries A and B, if lottery A is preferred to lottery B then for all lotteries C, and all  [0,1],
an   probability mixture of lotteries A and C is preferred to an   probability mixture of lotteries B and C:
 A  (1   )C  B  (1   )C. That is getting lottery A with probability  and lottery C otherwise is preferred to the
lottery that offers lottery B with the same probability  and lottery C otherwise.
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The class of theories of decision under risk that we consider have functionals that can be
written in forms similar to (EU-2) but that relax the assumption of linearity in probabilities. The
utility of a lottery, L for this class of theories is given by
m 1

(NL-1)

U ( L)  v( ym ) f ( Pm )   ( yk )[ f ( Pk )  f ( Pk 1 )]
k 1

where f () is a continuous, positively-monotonic function that transforms decumulative
probabilities and, as above, v() is a continuous, positively-monotonic function that transforms
payoffs. Of course, the EU functional is the special case of (NL-1) in which the probability
transformation function is the identity mapping, f ( P)  P.
Theories with functionals that are nonlinear in both payoffs and probabilities include rank
dependent utility theory (Quiggin 1993) and cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman
1992). We subsequently refer to this class of theories as NLPP theories.
In the case of dual theory of expected utility (DU), the functional is the special case of (NL1) that is linear in payoffs. The DU functional takes the simple form
m 1

(DU-1)

U ( L)  ym f ( Pm )   yk [ f ( Pk )  f ( Pk 1 )]
k 1

that is dual to (EU-2). The distinguishing property of (DU-1), linearity in payoffs, follows from
the Dual Independence Axiom (Yaari 1987).4 Recall that, for DU, risk aversion is equivalent to

f () being convex (see Yaari 1987, p.107).
We begin with two examples that illustrate payoffs calibrations and probabilities
calibrations. For ease of exposition, the examples build on EU and DU because of the simplicity
that follows from linearity in either probabilities or payoffs. The propositions reported in sections
3 and 4, however, show that each of the dual patterns of risk aversion by itself has implausible
implications for NLPP theories, such as rank dependent utility theory (Quiggin 1993) and
cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman 1992), that are characterized by functionals
that are nonlinear in both payoffs and probabilities. As shown by Corollary 2.2 in section 4, the

4

The Dual Independence Axiom (Yaari 1987, pp.99) is: (DIA) For all lotteries A and B, if lottery A is preferred to
lottery B, then for all lotteries C, and all  [0,1],   payoff mixture of lotteries A and C is preferred to   payoff
mixture of lotteries B and C: ( PA1  (1   )PC1 )1 ( PB1  (1  )PC1 )1 where (  )-1 is a (generalized) inverse
operator whereas PA and PB denote decumulative probability distribution functions of lotteries A and B.
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probabilities calibration patterns described in section 2.2 also have implausible risk aversion
implications for rank dependent models with endogenous reference amounts of payoff.
The first example, that illustrates payoffs calibration, builds on a pattern of small stakes risk
aversion that appears in Rabin (2000). This pattern conforms to the dual theory of expected
utility because of linearity of the DU functional in payoffs, as explained below. The second
example, that illustrates probabilities calibration, builds on a pattern of risk aversion introduced
in Sadiraj (2012). This second pattern conforms to expected utility theory because of linearity of
the EU functional in probabilities, as explained below.
2.1 Example 1: John Doe’s Risk Preferences Conform to the Dual Theory of
Expected Utility
Suppose that John Doe, whose initial wealth is $125, is observed to reject a 50/50 bet in which
he could lose $100 or gain $110. Does decision theory make any predictions about what choice
John would make at other wealth levels? Expected utility theory makes no prediction based on
this one observation unless one adds special-case assumptions about risk attitudes such as
constant or decreasing absolute risk aversion. In contrast, dual theory of expected utility (Yaari
1987) makes a general prediction about John’s choices. According to the DU functional (as in
(DU-1)), John’s rejection of the 50/50 lose $100 or gain $110 bet at initial wealth level $125
reveals 125  U DU (bet )  (125  110) f (0.5)  (125 100)(1  f (0.5))  125  210 f (0.5)  100; thus

f (0.5)  100 / 210. From the last inequality it follows that w  U DU (bet ) for all initial wealth
w  $125 because w  U DU (bet )  (w  110) f (0.5)  (w 100)(1  f (0.5))  w  210 f (0.5) 100
is true if and only if f (0.5)  100 / 210 . Therefore, according to DU, John will (weakly) reject
the bet at all wealth levels if he does so at wealth level $125.
What are the implications for expected utility theory if one actually observes rejection of the
bet or indifference for all initial wealth levels in some finite interval? Consider the pairs of
lotteries in Table 1. The first row shows the alternative options discussed above, a choice
between certain payoff x  $125 in the option B column and a 50/50 bet, with outcomes $(x100) or $(x+110) in the option A column. Now suppose that (as predicted by dual theory of
expected utility) additional observations of John’s decisions under risk show him choosing
option B or indifference in all rows of Table 1. What are the implications of these observations
for EU? EU implies that, if John weakly prefers the certain payoff to the lottery in all rows of

7
Table 1, then he will also prefer a certain payoff of $3,000 to a 50/50 bet with payoffs of $125 or
$3.2 million (see Proposition 1 in section 3). What accounts for this implausible implication of
EU?
According to EU, choice of option B in the first row in Table 1 reveals that5

v(125)  0.5v(235)  0.5v(25), which together with the (weak) concavity of the continuously
differentiable function,6 v() imply that 110v '(235)  v(235)  v(125)  v(125)  v(25)  100v '(25).
Therefore v '(25  210)  (10 /11)v '(25). Choice of option B in the second row of Table 1 reveals
that v '(25  2  210)  (10 /11)v '(25  210) , which together with the penultimate inequality imply
v '(25  2  210)  (10 /11)2 v '(25) . Similarly, it can be verified that v '(25  210t )  (10 /11)t v '(25)

follows from the weak preference for option B in all rows one to t in Table 1. So, if option B is
not rejected in all rows of Table 1, then the (weak) concave utility of payoffs explanation of
these choices implies that
v '(24,175)  v '(25  115  210)  (10 /11)115 v '(25)  0.00002  v '(25).

Such extreme diminishing marginal utility produces ridiculously low marginal utilities for large
payoffs that leads to implausible large-stakes risk aversion such as the one stated at the end of
the preceding paragraph.
2.2 Example 2: Jane Doe’s Risk Preferences Conform to Expected Utility Theory
Now suppose that Jane Doe has been observed to reject a 50/50 bet that pays $30 or $0 in favor
of a bet that pays $30 with probability 0.45, $10 with probability 0.1, or $0 with probability 0.45.
Does decision theory make any predictions about what choice Jane would make when given
options with higher or lower probability for the high payoff (of $30) but with the same 0.1
probability of the middle outcome (of $10)? DU makes no prediction based on this one
observation unless one adds special-case assumptions about risk attitudes. In contrast, EU makes
a general prediction about Jane’s choices. Using the functional in statement (EU-1), one infers
that Jane’s rejection of the two-outcome bet reveals that 0.5  v(30)  0.45  v(30)  0.1 v(10) if,
without any loss of generality, the utility of outcome 0 is normalized to 0. The last inequality
simplifies to 0  0.05v(30)  0.1 v(10) . Adding p  v(30) to both sides of the immediately
Recall that for the terminal wealth model v( yk )  u ( w  yk ), whereas for the income model v( yk )  u ( yk ).
This illustrative example uses a differentiable utility function for simplicity. Concavity calibration does not require
differentiability; see appendix A.1 or Rabin (2000).
5
6
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preceding inequality, one has p  v(30)  ( p  0.05)  v(30)  0.1 v(10) . Hence, EU predicts that
Jane will (weakly) reject the two-outcome lottery that pays $30 with probability p and $0
otherwise, in favor of the three-outcome lottery that pays $30 with probability p  0.05 , $10 with
probability 0.1 and $0 otherwise, for all p {0.05, 0.1,

, 0.95} , if she does so for p  0.5 .

What are the implications for DU if one actually observes the choices that conform to EU,
(weak) rejection of the two-outcome lottery in favor of the three-outcome lottery for all
p {0.05, 0.1,

, 0.95} ? Consider the pairs of lotteries in Table 2. Row 10 shows the first pair of

options discussed above, a choice between a 50/50 bet that pays $30 or $0 in the option A
column and a bet that pays $30 with probability 9/20, $10 with probability 2/20, or $0 with
probability 9/20 in the option B column. Suppose that (as predicted by expected utility theory)
observations of Jane’s decisions under risk show her choosing option B or indifference in all
rows of Table 2. Probabilities calibration (see section 4) shows that these observations have the
implausible implication that Jane will also prefer a certain payoff of $3,000 to a 50/50 bet that
pays $3 million or $0. What accounts for this implausible implication of DU?
Consider row 18 of Table 2. According to DU, the dual expected utilities of option A18 and
option B18 are U ( A18 )  30 f (18 / 20) and U ( B18 )  30 f (17 / 20)  10[ f (19 / 20)  f (17 / 20)].
Subtraction of 10 f (18 / 20) from both U ( A18 ) and U ( B18 ) , and rearrangement of terms shows
that U ( B18 )  U ( A18 ) if and only if [ f (19 / 20)  f (18 / 20)]  2[ f (18 / 20)  f (17 / 20)] . It
follows from the last inequality and convexity of the continuously differentiable function, 7 f ()
that f (19 / 20)  2 f '(17 / 20) . Next, rejection of the two-outcome lottery in favor of the three
outcome lottery in row 16 implies f (17 / 20)  2 f (15 / 20) . Hence rejection of the two-outcome
lottery in rows 16 and 18 reveals f (19 / 20)  22 f (15 / 20). Similarly, rejection of the twooutcome lottery in all of the even-numbered rows of Table 2 reveals that
9
 129
 128
 1
 1
f ( 19
20 )  f ( 20 )  2 f ( 20 )  ...  2 f ( 20 )  512 f ( 20 ) .

Such extreme increasing marginal probability transformation produces implausible risk aversion
such as the one stated above.
7

The proofs of Proposition 2 and its corollaries do not require either differentiability or convexity. To see that
extreme implications follow for cases in which the probability transformation is not everywhere convex assume it
has an inverted S-shape with an inflection point at 1/3; in that case one still gets extreme risk aversion as revealed
by: f (19 / 20)  f ((7  2  6) / 20)  26 f (7 / 20).
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2.3 Postulated Preferences for John and Jane Doe Are Paradoxical
The postulated risk preferences for John and Jane Doe imply a double paradox: (a) John’s
pattern, that conforms to the dual theory of expected utility theory, has implausible risk aversion
implications for expected utility theory; and (b) Jane’s pattern, that conforms to expected utility
theory, has implausible risk aversion implications for the dual theory of expected utility theory.
In sections 3 and 4 we offer a dual analysis of implications of patterns of risk aversion that
(P.1) conform to the dual theory of expected utility or (P.2) conform to expected utility theory.
The analysis shows that both patterns of type (P.1) and patterns of type (P.2) have implausible
risk aversion implication for theories, such as rank dependent utility theory (Quiggin 1993) and
cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman 1992), with functionals that are nonlinear in
both payoffs and probabilities.
The empirical relevance of these thought exercises with patterns of risk aversion rests on
empirical validity of (weaker versions of) the patterns of risk aversion assumed in the above
examples. We address this issue with the experiments reported in sections 5 and 6. We next turn
our attention to formal statements of calibration propositions and corollaries in sections 3 and 4.

3 Payoffs Calibrations
Calibration propositions for theories with nonlinear utility of money payoffs have been reported
in several papers (cited above in the introduction). In order to provide a foundation for our
payoffs calibration experiments, we report a calibration proposition for expected utility theory
and a corollary that applies to rank-dependent theories on finite domains. The focus is on finite
domains because of our intention to apply the theory to data from experiments. Design of
experiments reported in section 5 is based on the calibration patterns discussed here.
3.1 Calibration for Nonlinear Payoff Transformation Functions
Consider payoff calibration patterns like those in Example 1 of section 2.1. For bounded
intervals of income, Proposition 1 states a payoff calibration result for expected utility theory
with weakly concave utility of money payoff function u () .8

8

See Rabin (2000) and Cox and Sadiraj (2006) for concavity calibrations on unbounded domains.
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The following standard notation is used:

indicates weak preference;

indicates strong

preference; {z, p; y} denotes a binary lottery that pays z and y with probabilities p and 1  p;
 x  is the largest integer smaller than x.

Let the domain of monetary prizes be a closed interval, [m, M ]  (0, ). For any given
positive payoffs

, g such that 0   g let z*  m  (  g )  (2  ln 2 / ln( / g )). Consider

statements
P.1
Q.1

x {x  g ,0.5; x  }, for all integers x  [m, M ]

{z  G,0.5; m} z,

for some z  ( z* , M ) and sufficiently large G  ( z  m) g / .
Proposition 1. Let prizes , g such that 0   g and positive integer m be given. Then
a. DU predicts that statement P.1 is equivalent to 0 {g ,0.5;  },
b. For all z  z* and all G  ( z  m) g / ,
(i) for all M  m both statements P.1 and Q.1 are true for DU with
 zm

f (0.5)  
,

 z mG g  

(ii) there exists M  m such that P.1 and Q.1 cannot both be true for EU.
Proof Parts (a) and (b.i) are straightforward; for part (b.ii) see appendix A.1.
Part (a) of this proposition says that any DU agent who rejects lottery {g , 0.5;  } will
satisfy pattern P.1; the inverse is also true. Part (b) says, that for G as large as one wants it to be,
there are DU agents but no EU agents who satisfy both patterns P.1 and Q.1. The proof is
constructive with respect to M. The following expression that relates M to G and z (see the proof
in appendix A.1, inequality (a.9)) will be useful in our numerical illustrations:
(*) G / ( g  )  N  K  1  r  N A(r, K ),

where K  ( z  m) / ( g  )  , N  (M  m) / ( g  )  , A(r, K )  r  r1 K  r K and r  / g. We
use statements () and P.1 in Proposition 1 to construct the illustrative examples that are
reported in Table 3.

11
Suppose that an agent weakly prefers the certain amount of income x to the binary lottery

{x  110,0.5; x 100} , for all integers x [100, M ] , where values of M are given in the
“Rejection Intervals” column of Table 3. In that case all three expected utility (of terminal
wealth, income, and initial wealth and income) models9 predict that the agent prefers receiving
the amount of income 3,000 for sure to a risky lottery {z  G,0.5;100} , where the values of

z  G( G* ) are given in the second column of Table 3. For example, if [m, M ]  [100, 50000] ,
as in the last row of Table 3, then G*  0.4 1012 ; that is, expected utility theory implies that the
agent will prefer 3,000 for sure to a 50/50 lottery that pays 100 or 0.40 1012 . According to the
entry in the third column and M = 30,000 row of Table 3, expected utility theory predicts that if
an agent prefers certain payoff in amount x to lottery {x  90,0.5; x  50} , for all integers x
between 100 and 30,000, then such an agent will prefer 3,000 for sure to the 50/50 lottery with
positive outcomes of 100 or 0.10 1057 .
3.2 Calibration for Fixed Reference Payoff Models
The generalization of Proposition 1 is straightforward for the NLPP class of theories that
includes cumulative prospect theory with zero-income reference point (Tversky and Kahneman,
1992) and rank dependent utility theory (Quiggin, 1993). We use R( p) to denote the following
function R( p)  (1  h( p)) / h( p) g , p  (0,1]. One has:
Corollary 1.1. Suppose that the value function is (weakly) concave. For any positive prizes , g
such that R(0.5)  1, NLPP theories predict that for all z  z*  m  (  g )(2  ln 2 / ln( R(0.5))
and any given large G there exists M such that z, M and G satisfy inequality (*) with r=R(0.5)
and statements P.1 and Q.1 cannot both be true.
Proof See appendix A.1.
Recall that for expected utility theory, with a functional that is linear in probabilities,
Proposition 1 reveals implausible large-stakes risk aversion if g  . In the corollary, this
implication holds when h(0.5) g  [1  h(0.5)] , which is equivalent to r  R(0.5)  1 . Examples
that illustrate the implications of Corollary 1.1 are similar to those in Table 3.
9

See Cox and Sadiraj (2006) for discussion of these three expected utility models.
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A reference-dependent theory can incorporate variable reference amounts of money payoff.
Wakker (2005, 2010) explains that variable reference payoffs can immunize prospect theory to
payoffs calibration arguments based on the small-stakes risk aversion pattern (Rabin 2000). A
straightforward extension of Wakker’s arguments implies that the Markowitz (1952) model can
be immunized to payoffs calibration by a suitable interpretation of its reference points.
Empirical validity of the P.1 pattern of small-stakes risk aversion is testable. Section 5
reports experiments on this question.

4 Probabilities Calibrations
We now consider varying probabilities, fixed payoffs patterns of risk aversion like those in
Example 2 of section 2.2. We report a calibration proposition for the dual theory of expected
utility and corollaries that apply to (NLPP) theories that have functionals that are nonlinear in
both probabilities and payoffs. The design of experiments reported in section 6 is based on
patterns of risk preferences discussed here.
4.1 Calibration for Nonlinear Probability Transformation Functions
Consider 2n-1 pairs of lotteries Ai and Bi, i  I 2 n1 . Lottery Ai  { y, pi } pays a positive amount of
money y with probability pi or the amount 0 with probability 1- pi. Denote   1/ 2n and let
pi  i / 2n, i  I 2 n1 . Lottery Bi  { y, pi   ; x, 2 } pays the amount y with probability pi   or

the amount x, x  (0, y) with probability 2 or the amount 0 with probability 1  ( pi    2 ).
Suppose that an agent (weakly) prefers the three outcome lottery Bi to the two outcome
lottery Ai, for all i  I 2 nk* , where k * is a positive integer not larger than n. Note that by linearity
in probabilities (see EU-1) any expected utility maximizer who prefers x for sure to the 50/50
lottery that pays y or 0 satisfies this supposition. Discussion following the statement of
Proposition 2, however, shows that if the high outcome y is larger than twice the intermediate
outcome x then this supposition implies implausible risk aversion for DU agents.
Let prizes x, y such that y  2 x  0 , and positive integer k * be given. For any integer n,
n  k * consider the following statements

P.2

{ y, (i  1) / 2n; x,1/ n} { y, i / 2n}, for all i {1, 2,..., 2n  k *}

Q.2

{zG,0.5} {z,1  (k * 1) / 2n}, for some positive z and large G.
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Proposition 2. Let prizes x, y such that y  2 x  0 , and positive integer k * be given. Then
a. For EU, statement P.2 is equivalent to x { y,0.5}.
b. For any given sufficiently large G
(i) for all integers n  k * both statements P.2 and Q.2 are true for EU with v( y)  2v( x)
and 2v(1/ G)  v(1).
(ii) there exist integers n  k * such that statements P.2 and Q.2 cannot both be true for
DU.
Proof Parts (a) and (b.i) are straightforward; for part (b.ii) see appendix A.2.
The proof is constructive with respect to n and G. The following expression that relates n to
G (see the proof in the appendix A.2, inequality (a.12)) will be useful in our numerical
illustrations:
(**) G  T ( y / x, n  k * , n 1),
m

where T (t , m, n)  1   (t  1) j 1
j 0

n

 (t 1)

i

. We use statements (**) and P.2 in Proposition 2

i 0

to construct the illustrative examples that are reported in Table 4 for the special case of k *  1.
In the table, C denotes the ratio of the highest payoff to the second highest payoff in the three
prize lottery, C  y / x. With C = 2.5 and n = 20, Proposition 2 tells us that for this P.2 pattern
with DU predicts that the agent prefers 1,000 for sure to a lottery that pays 3.3 million or 0 with
even odds, as reported in the second column and third row of Table 4. With C = 3.5 and n = 50,
the prediction is preference for 1,000 for sure over a 50/50 lottery that pays 0 or 0.78  1023 , as
reported in the fourth column and fourth row of Table 4. Finally, with C  5 and n = 10, the
prediction is preference for 1,000 for sure to the 50/50 lottery that pays 0 or 1 billion.
4.2 Calibration for Reference Dependent Models
Proposition 2 is stated for the dual theory of expected utility that is characterized by a preference
functional that is linear in payoffs and nonlinear in decumulative probabilities. The
generalization is straightforward for the NLPP class of theories. First consider a NLPP model
with fixed, zero-income reference point, as in Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and Quiggin
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(1993). For nonlinear transformation of payoff functions  () that are sub-additive on positive
payoffs one has:
Corollary 2.1. For  ( y)  2 ( x) , NLPP models with zero-income reference point predict that
for any given sufficiently large G there exist integers n  k * such that statements P.2 and Q.2
can’t both be true.
Proof: see appendix A.2.
For NLPP models with zero-income reference point the relation between n and G is given
by G  T ( ( y) /  ( x), n  k * , n 1) . Implications of Corollary 2.1 for the special case in which
k *  1 are given in Table 4 for the (alternative) definition C   ( y) /  ( x) . For example, if the

value of the high payoff  ( y ) is at least 3 times as large as the value of the intermediate
(positive) payoff  ( x) then implications of calibration pattern P.2 are given by the C  3
column of Table 4, and so on.
Probabilities calibration does not apply to the Markowitz (1952) model because its
functional is linear in probabilities. In contrast, probabilities calibration applies to rank
dependent models because of their nonlinear transformation of probabilities, whether or not the
reference point is exogenous. The reason for this is straightforward: the calibration is constructed
by varying the probabilities for which three or two payoffs are paid, not by varying the payoff
amounts. Hence it makes no difference to this calibration whether the reference amount of payoff
is or is not fixed at zero payoff. Here is a formal statement of the result that the calibration
applies to rank dependent models with endogenous reference payoff. Let  ()  0 denote the
value function for negative payoffs. For  () sub-additive on positive payoffs one has:
Corollary 2.2. Let the reference point be the intermediate payoff x and  ( y  x)   ( x). Rank
dependent models predict that for any given sufficiently large G there exist integers n  k * such
that statements P.2 and Q.2 cannot both be true.
Proof See appendix A.2.
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It can be verified (see appendix A.2) that the relation between n and G in this case is given
by G  T ( R  1, n  k * , n  1), where R   ( y  x) /  ( x). Similar corollaries can be stated for
cases in which the endogenous reference point is the highest payoff or the lowest payoff (or other
convex combinations of the high and low payoffs) rather than the intermediate payoff. Empirical
validity of the pattern P.2 is testable. Section 6 reports experiments on this question.

5 Experiments with Varying Payoffs
We ran three experiments with calibration patterns (P.1) for payoff transformation theories
identified in Proposition 1 and Corollary 1.1 in Calcutta (India) and Magdeburg (Germany). We
explain the common features and idiosyncratic lotteries used in these experiments after
presenting a detailed discussion of one experiment to provide a representative example.
5.1 Experimental Design: An Example
Subjects in one experiment parameterization were asked to make six choices between a certain
amount of money x and a binary lottery {x  30,0.5; x  20} for values of x from the set {100,
1K, 2K, 4K, 5K, 6K}, where K = 1,000. Subjects were asked to choose among option A (the risky
lottery), option B (the certain amount of money), and option I (indifference). The choice tasks
given to the subjects for this parameterization are presented in Table 5. Each row of Table 5
shows a certain amount of money and paired lottery in a choice task included in the experiment.
The subjects were not presented with a fixed order of decision tasks, as in Table 5. Instead, each
pair of a sure payoff and a risky lottery was shown on a separate (response form) page. Each
subject picked up a set of response pages that were arranged in independently drawn random
order. He or she could mark choices in any order desired.
5.2 Experimental Design: Alternative Parameterizations and Protocols
We conducted three experiments on empirical validity of the calibration pattern P.1 in
Proposition 1. These experiments used the random decision selection payoff protocol in which
one of each subject’s several decisions is randomly selected for payoff at the end of the
experiment. In the Calcutta 30 / 20 experiment, binary lotteries {x  30,0.5; x  20} and sure
payoffs x were from the set {100, 1K, 2K, 4K, 5K, 6K}, where K = 1,000; payoffs were in
rupees. In the Calcutta 90 / 50 experiment, binary lotteries {x  90,0.5; x  50} and sure payoffs
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x were from the set {50, 800, 1.7K, 2.7K, 3.8K, 5K}, where K = 1,000; payoffs were in rupees.

Finally, in the Magdeburg 110 / 100 experiment, binary lotteries {x  110,0.5; x 100} and sure
payoffs x were from the set {3K, 9K, 50K, 70K, 90K, 110K}, where K = 1,000; payoffs were in
contingent euros.
An appendix available from the authors reports the subject instructions (in English), the
response forms (or pages), and detailed information on the protocol used in all of the
experiments. Before presenting data, we note economic significance of rupee payoffs in Calcutta
experiments and the meaning of contingent euro payoffs in the Magdeburg experiment.
5.3 Economic Significance of Payoffs
Data collected in Calcutta at the time of the first experiment show that the 50 rupee amount at
risk in the Calcutta 30/-20 experiment lotteries was the monetary equivalent of: (a) a full day’s
pay for the student subjects; (b) 15 (grocery store) servings of chicken; or (c) 14 bus tickets.
Rupee payoffs in the Calcutta 90/-50 experiment were even more significant.
The Magdeburg 110/-100 experiment used contingent payoffs in amounts as high as 110K
euros. We could offer to pay such large amounts in contingent euros by using a casino payoff
protocol explained in appendix A.3.
5.4 Data Provide Support for the Concavity Calibration Pattern P.1
Statement P.1 in Proposition 1 involves weak preference for (safe) option B over (risky) option
A. Therefore, in all tests we aggregate choices of option B with (the very small number of)
choices of option I (indifference) and denote the aggregated choice category as B I. We report
tests for incidence in the data of patterns of choices that, according to Proposition 1 and
Corollary 1.1, imply implausible risk aversion in the large with expected utility theory and, for
the experiments in Calcutta, with original cumulative prospect theory (with zero-income
reference point) and with rank dependent utility theory.
We use error-rate analysis for statistical inferences on the proportion of subjects who made
choices consistent with the calibration patterns.10 Choice probabilities are assumed to deviate
from 1 or 0 by an error rate  , as in Harless and Camerer (1994). Thus if BI is preferred to A
then Pr(choose BI)= 1   and if BI is not preferred to A then Pr(choose BI)=  , where   0.5. The
10

We are grateful to Nathaniel Wilcox for generous advice about this approach to data analysis and for supplying
SAS code. See Wilcox (2008) for discussion of econometric methods for analysis of data from binary discrete
choice under risk.
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error rate model postulates that a subject with real preferences for BI (respectively A) over A
(respectively BI) in all six rows could nevertheless be observed to have chosen BI in five (or
fewer) out of six rows. That is, the model allows that a subject with real underlying preferences
such as [BI, BI, BI, BI, BI, BI] could, instead, choose a different pattern, say [BI, BI, BI, A, BI, BI],
an event with probability (1   )5  , where  is an error rate.
Models I, II, and III considered here are as follows. Model I includes only choices of all BI
(corresponding to M = 6,000 in Proposition 1 for the Calcutta 30/-20 experiment, for example) as
a calibration pattern and its mirror, all A’s as the other pattern. Let the small stakes lotteries be
{x+30, 0.5; x-20} for x from 100 to 6,000. According to Proposition 1, the choice pattern “all BI”
implies that 1,000 for sure is preferred to the lottery that pays 0.13x1023 or 100 with equal
probabilities. Model II (which corresponds to Proposition 1 with M = 5,000 for the Calcutta 30/20 experiment) contains the Model I pair of (calibration and other) patterns, and one additional
calibration pattern with A as the last entry (for x = 6,000) and its mirror image as an additional
“other pattern.” According to Proposition 1, the calibration patterns in Model II imply that
getting 1,000 for sure is preferred to the 50/50 lottery that pays 0.409  1019 or 100. Finally,
Model III (which corresponds to Proposition 1 with M = 4,000 for the Calcutta 30/-20
experiment) contains patterns with four sequential BI in the first four positions (for x = 100,
1000, 2000, and 4000) as calibration patterns and their mirror images as other patterns. With
these calibration patterns, Proposition 1 implies that getting 1,000 for sure is preferred to the
lottery that pays 0.12  1016 or 100 with equal probabilities.
The top row in Table 6 shows estimated proportions of subjects whose choices satisfy the
calibration patterns for versions of Models I, II, and III using data from Calcutta 90/-50. The
estimated proportion for Model I (M = 5,000) is 0.82, with Wald 90 percent confidence interval
(0.70, 0.94). The estimated proportions for all three models vary between 0.81 and 0.82; all are
significant at one percent (indicated by superscripted double asterisks, **). The estimations for
Calcutta 90/-50 imply that 81 to 82 percent of the subjects in this experiment made choices that
conform to payoffs calibration patterns P.1 that are problematic for expected utility theory, rank
dependent utility theory, and cumulative prospect theory with fixed reference point. The second
row of Table 6 reports estimates for data from Calcutta 30/-20. The estimated proportions vary
between 0.43 and 0.48, and all are significant at one percent. Estimates in the third row for data
from Magdeburg 110/-100 are 0.54; all are significant at one percent.
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6 Experiments with Varying Probabilities
We ran four probabilities calibration pattern P.2 experiments in Germany, India, and the United
States. We explain the common design features and idiosyncratic lotteries in these experiments
and present a more detailed discussion of one experiment to provide a representative example.
We begin with the example.
6.1 Experimental Design: An Example
Subjects in one experiment parameterization were asked to make choices for each of the nine
pairs of lotteries shown in Table 7. The fractions in the rows of the table are the probabilities of
receiving the prizes in the two outcome (option A) and three outcome (option B) lotteries. Each
row of Table 7 shows a pair of lotteries included in the experiment. The subjects were not
presented with a fixed order of lottery pairs, as in Table 7. Instead, each lottery pair was shown
on a separate (response form) page. Each subject picked up a set of response pages that were
arranged in independently drawn random order. He or she could mark choices in any order
desired. On each decision page, a subject was asked to choose among a two outcome lottery
(option A in some row of Table 7), a three outcome lottery (option B in the same row of Table
7), and indifference (“option I”).
6.2 Experimental Design: Alternative Parameterizations and Protocols
We conducted four experiments on empirical validity of the calibration pattern P.2 postulated in
Proposition 2. One experiment parameterization uses pairs of two outcome and three outcome
lotteries, Aj  { y, p j ;0} and B j  { y, p j  0.1; x,0.2;0} , for j {1, 2,...,9} , and y  14 , x  4 as
shown in Table 7. We also ran experiments with the parameterizations { y, x}  {40,10} and
{400,80}.
The experiments were conducted in Magdeburg (Germany), Atlanta (U.S.A.) and Calcutta
(India) with payoffs, respectively, in euros, U.S. dollars, and Indian rupees. The experiments
used the following parameters: in the Magdeburg 40/10 experiment, y  40 euros and x  10
euros; in the Atlanta 40/10 experiment, y  40 dollars and x  10 dollars; in the Atlanta 14/4
experiment, y  14 dollars and x  4 dollars; in the Calcutta 400/80 experiment, y  400 rupees
and x  80 rupees. Economic significance of rupee payoffs is discussed in section 5.3. The two
experiments in Atlanta each included two treatments that used different payoff protocols. One
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protocol is the conventional one in which a single decision by a subject is randomly selected for
payoff at the end of the experiment; this is labeled POR, for “pay one randomly,” in Table 8. The
other payoff protocol is the one that is theoretically incentive compatible for dual theory of
expected utility (Cox, Sadiraj, and Schmidt 2012). In this payoff protocol, all decisions are paid
correlated at the end. In order to keep the level of incentives similar across payoff mechanisms,
we used the version of the protocol in which the amounts of all payoffs are divided by the
number of decisions; this is labeled PAC/9, for “pay all correlated/9,” in Table 8. An appendix
available from the authors reports subject instructions (in English), response forms (or pages),
and detailed information on the protocol used in all of the experiments.
6.3 Data Provide Support for Calibration Pattern P.2
In testing for the presence of choices that satisfy the calibration pattern, we aggregate choices of
option B with (the very small number of) choices of option I (indifference) because statement P.2
in Proposition 2 involves weak preference for B over A. Aggregated choices of B and I are
reported as BI. Subjects’ choice patterns are recorded as sequences of nine letters, ordered
according to the probability of the high outcome. For example, the pattern [A, B I, BI, A, BI, BI,
BI, BI, A] would indicate that a subject chose A (a two outcome lottery) when the probability of
the high outcome was 1/10, 4/10 and 9/10 ‒ indexed as j  1, 4 and 9 ‒ and chose B or I for all
other values of the index j. For the experiment with parameterization shown in Table 7, this
pattern would mean the subject chose option A on (randomly ordered) pages with the lottery
pairs in rows 1, 4, and 9 in the table and chose option B or option I on all other pages.
We use error rate models to draw statistical conclusions from these data. The error rate
model postulates that a subject with real preferences for BI (respectively A) over A (respectively
BI) in all nine lottery pairs could nevertheless be observed to have chosen the other option in
some rows. For example, according to this model a subject with underlying preferences [BI, BI,
BI, BI, BI, BI, BI, BI, BI] could, instead, be observed to choose a different pattern such as [BI, BI,
A, BI, A, BI, BI, BI, BI], an event with probability (1   )7  2 .
Stochastic choice Model I contains only the choice pattern with a sequence of nine BI in the
category “calibration pattern” and its dual (“mirror”) image with a sequence of nine A in the
“other pattern.” According to Proposition 2, this calibration pattern implies that 1,000 for sure is
preferred to the 50/50 lottery that pays 98,000 or 0 for the Atlanta 14/4 experiment, as reported
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in the third row in Table 8. For the Calcutta 400/80 experiment, Proposition 2 implies that 1,000
for sure is preferred to the 50/50 lottery that pays 1 million or 0, as reported in the bottom row in
Table 8.
Model I is overly conservative in its specification of calibration patterns because other data
patterns can be calibrated to imply implausible risk aversion. Stochastic choice Model II includes
two patterns in the category “calibration patterns”: the pattern with choice of BI for index
j {1, 2,...,8} and the all BI pattern (that is, j {1, 2,...,9} ). The mirror images of these two

patterns comprise the “other patterns” for Model II. Application of Proposition 2 demonstrates
that these two patterns of “no A except for index j  9 ” imply that 1,000 for sure is preferred to
the 50/50 lottery that pays 81,000 or 0, as reported for the Atlanta 40/10 and Magdeburg 40/10
listings in Table 8. We also consider Model III which includes the patterns “no A except for
indexes j  8 and/or 9” in the category of calibration patterns. The mirror images of these
patterns comprise the other patterns for Model III. An implication of Proposition 2 for these
calibration patterns in case of n = 5 and C = 4 is preference for 1,000 for sure to the 50/50 lottery
that pays 27,000 or 0, as shown in the Atlanta 40/10 and Magdeburg 40/10 listings in the table.
Table 8 reports results from maximum likelihood estimation of the proportion of subjects
who exhibit the calibration patterns for Models I, II and III. The first row of Table 8 shows
results for data from the Atlanta 14/4 experiment with POR payoff protocol. For Model I the
estimated proportion of subjects who exhibited the calibration pattern is 0.74. The Wald 90
percent confidence interval is (0.55, 0.93). The 0.74 estimate is significant at one percent (as
indicated by double asterisks, **). The other columns in the first row of Table 8 report the
estimated proportions of subjects whose choice patterns in the Atlanta 14/4, POR protocol
treatment conform to calibration patterns of Models I, II, and III. These estimates vary between
0.74 and 0.88, and they are all significant at one percent. Results look similar for the Atlanta
14/4, PAC/9 protocol data in the second row of Table 8 except that the proportions of subjects
consistent with the calibration patterns are even higher; they vary from 0.81 to 0.93.
Table 8 shows the estimated proportions of subjects whose choices are consistent with
calibration patterns in experiments Atlanta 40/10, Magdeburg 40/10, and Calcutta 400/80.
Depending on the model, the estimated proportion of subjects with data consistent with the
calibration patterns in the Atlanta 40/10, POR protocol treatment varies from 0.56 to 0.59, all
significant at one percent. Results look somewhat different for the Atlanta 40/10, PAC/9 protocol
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data; here, the estimated proportions of subjects with choices consistent with the calibration
patterns again are higher; they vary from 0.76 to 0.93. The estimates for data from Magdeburg
40/10 vary from 0.65 to 0.71, all significant at one percent. Estimates with data from experiment
Calcutta 400/80 lie between 0.72 and 0.73; all are significant at one percent.

7 Is There a Plausible Theory for Decision under Risk?
Prominent theories of decision under risk model individuals’ preferences over lotteries with
nonlinear transformation of money payoffs and/or nonlinear transformation of probabilities.
Previous calibration literature, sparked by Rabin (2000), has focused on the implications of
nonlinear transformation of payoffs. Sadiraj (2012) offers calibrations that focus on the
implications of nonlinear transformation of probabilities. Theories with functionals that are
nonlinear in both probabilities and payoffs are vulnerable to both types of calibration. If one
allows for variable reference amounts of payoff, the probabilities calibration is problematic for
these theories but the payoffs calibrations appearing elsewhere in the literature are not.
This paper develops a dual analysis of the calibration patterns. Taken together, the two
calibration propositions provide a paradoxical insight into theories of decision under risk: a
pattern of risk aversion that conforms to rational behavior for a theory with utility functional that
is linear in probabilities (respectively, linear in payoffs) has implausible implications for a theory
with functional that is linear in payoffs (respectively, linear in probabilities).
The internal consistency problems that follow from probabilities calibration are even more
problematic than those from payoffs calibration. Whereas, the payoffs calibration critique applies
across “small” and “large” payoff domains, the probabilities calibration critique also holds
within a (“small” or “large”) payoff domain.
First, note that the scale of the payoffs in pattern Q.1 depends on both the scale of payoffs in
pattern P.1 and the length of the interval where P.1 holds. The scale of payoffs in pattern P.1
involves small-stakes risk aversion but the pattern Q.1 must characterize risk attitudes at largestakes to make the pair paradoxical. Alternatively, P.1 must involve small-stakes risk aversion to
pair paradoxically with a given plausible Q.1 in the large. Therefore, varying-payoffs, fixedprobabilities calibrations question the ability of expected utility theory, rank dependent utility
theory, and cumulative prospect theory with fixed reference point to rationalize plausible risk
attitudes across different domains of risk: “small-stakes” and “large-stakes”.
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In contrast, the scale of the payoffs in pattern P.2 is not required to be different from the
scale of payoffs in pattern Q.2.11 Therefore, probabilities calibration questions the ability of dual
theory of expected utility and rank dependent theories with exogenous (zero income) or
endogenous reference point to rationalize plausible risk attitudes not only across different
domains of payoffs (small versus large) but also within the same domain of payoffs.
Previous literature has not offered real-payoff, controlled experiment data on patterns of risk
aversion that appear in calibration suppositions. This paper reports data from several
experiments. As explained in section 6, the data provide support for empirical validity of risk
aversion patterns underlying both of the dual calibrations.
Popular theories of decision under risk have been shown to be vulnerable to calibration
critique. This suggests a central question: What properties would characterize a theory of riskavoiding preferences that would not be called into question by the critique? The answer follows
from the dual calibration propositions and corollaries presented in this paper. A theory of risk
preferences with a functional that is linear in probabilities would be immune to the probabilities
calibration critique. A theory with variable reference payoffs would be immune to the payoffs
calibration critique. The vintage Markowitz (1952, pp. 154-155) model has these two properties
if one identifies the second inflection point with the windfall gain offered by the sure option in
the payoff calibration pattern.12 Although a version of the Markowitz model does survive the
critique, unlike all of the currently popular models, whether the former can survive other
experimental tests is a question that needs to be addressed in subsequent research.

11

For example, Proposition 2 and its corollaries tell us that the following two statements are inconsistent for DU and
NLPP models. Statement P.2e: The three outcome lottery that pays 400 or 80 or 0 with probabilities p  0.1 , 0.2
and 1  ( p  0.1  0.2) is preferred to the two outcome lottery that pays 400 or 0 with probabilities p and 1 – p, for all
p in {0.1, 0.2, …, 0.8, 0.9}. Statement Q.2e: The 50/50 lottery that pays 330 or 0 is preferred to a sure payoff of 10.
These statements P.2e and Q.2e involve implausible combinations of same-stakes risk aversion. Furthermore, this
same-stakes implausible risk aversion holds for all scales of payoffs because the P.2e and Q.2e statements are
dimension-invariant; that is, the numbers 400, 80, 330 and 10 could refer to numbers of cents, dollars or thousands
of dollars or millions of dollars or any other payoff scale. The figures 330 and 1 in statement Q.2e apply for all
utility, v() of prizes that satisfy v(400) / v(80)  3.
12
Unlike cumulative prospect theory with loss aversion, in a neighborhood of the origin the Markowitz model’s
transformation function for payoffs is convex on positive changes and concave on negative changes. How can one
get risk aversion of type P.1 with this model? As an example think of the function being x2 on the right of the origin
up to the third inflection point and being x3 on the left of the origin down to the first inflection point, where both the
first and the third inflection points are further from the origin than the gains (g) and the losses ( ) in pattern P.1.
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Appendix
A.1. Proof of Proposition 1 and Corollary 1
We state a general Proposition A.1 that applies to a theory with utility functional U as in
statement (NL-1). Proposition 1 and Corollary 1.1 follow directly from Proposition A.1.
General result 1.13 Let a decision theory with “utility functional” U as in statement (NL-1) be
given. Referring to statement P.1, denote a  , b  g 

and let N be the largest integer smaller

than (M  m) / b . For a general probability, p of the large outcome, x  g statement P.1 for a
sure outcome x  a becomes
(a.i)

x  a {x  b, p; x}, for all integers x [m  a, M  a].

Suppose that14
(a.ii)

bf ( p)  a,

where f () is the transformation function for decumulative probabilities as stated in the main
text. Let z*  m  b(2  ln 2 / ln q), where q  (1  f ( p)) / f ( p) g. Let K be the largest integer
smaller than ( z  m) / b, for a given z  ( z* , M ), and J be the largest integer smaller than
N  K  1  A(q, K )q  N , where A(q, K )  q  q1 K  q K .

Proposition A.1. For all (weakly) concave function, v() and all positive numbers a, b and f(p)
that satisfy (a.ii) one has:
1. For all M > m, for all z  ( z* , m  bN ), statement (a.i) implies z

{z  ( J  1)b, p; m};

2. For all positive G, for all z  z* there exists N such that statement (a.i) implies that

z

{z  G, p; m}.

Proof The proof of A.1.1 consists of two steps.
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This part of the proof is similar to Cox and Sadiraj (2006, pp.58).
For theories that assume linearity in probabilities and p = 0.5, condition (a.ii) is simply g  ; it says that the
expected value of risky lottery {b,0.5;0} is larger than the sure amount of money a. For theories that assume
nonlinearity in probabilities, condition (a.ii) says that the expected value of the risky lottery after applying the
probability transformation, i.e. EV( {b, f ( p);0} ) is larger than the sure amount of money a.
14
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First, we show that statements (NL-1), (a.i) and (weak) concavity of v() imply that for
all x [m  a, m  Nb  a]
v( x  jb)  v( x  ( j  1)b)  q j  v( x)  v( x  b)  , j   x ,

(a.1)

where  x is the set of all positive integers j such that x  ( j  1)b  a belongs to the interval

[m, m  Nb], that is  x  { j   | x  ( j  1)b  a [m, m  Nb]} .
Then, we show that for any given z  ( z* , m  bN ),
(a.2)

m  Kb {m  ( K  J )b, p; m}.

That is getting m  Kb for sure is preferred to the binary lottery {m  ( K  J )b, p; m}, which
completes the proof of part 1 since by construction of K, m  ( K  1)b  z  m  Kb and therefore

v( z)  v(m  Kb)  f ( p)v(m  ( K  J )b)  (1  f ( p))v(m)  f ( p)v( z  ( J 1)b)  (1  f ( p))v(m).
It follows from statements (NL-1) and (a.i) that
(a.3)

v( x  a)  (1  f ( p))v( x)  f ( p)v( x  b), x [m  a, m  Nb  a]  .

To derive (a.1) write v( x  a)  f ( p)v( x  a)  (1  f ( p))v( x  a) and rearrange terms in
(a.3) to get
(a.4)

(1  f ( p)) v( x  a)  v( x)  f ( p) v( x  b)  v( x  a)  , x [m  a, m  Nb  a]  .

Note that from (weak) concavity of v(), 15 (v( x)  v( x  g )) / g  (v( x  )  v( x)) / , which
together with statement (a.4) and using notations q  (1  f ( p)) / f ( p) g , a 

and b  g 

imply
 1  f ( p) 
1
v ( x  b)  v ( x )  v ( x  b) v ( x  a )  v ( x )  
 1  v( x  a )  v( x)  
 v( x)  v( x  g ) 
f ( p) g
 f ( p)

q
f ( p)

)  v ( x )  v ( x  g )   q  v ( x )  v ( x  g )  v ( x  g )  v ( x  b) 
 v( x)  v( x  g )   q(1 
1  f ( p)
1  f ( p)
 q  v ( x )  v ( x  b)  .

Finally, statement (a.1) follows from applying j times the preceding derived inequality,
v( x  b)  v( x)  q(v( x)  v( x  b)).
15

To see this write x as a convex combination of

x  and x  g and apply the definition of concavity to get

v( x)  v  ( x  g )  g ( x  ) / ( g  )    v( x  g )  gv( x  ) / ( g  ).
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To show statement (a.2), let y  m  Kb and verify that statement (a.1) implies
K 1

K 1

k 0

k 0

v( y)  v( y  bK )    v( y  kb)  v( y  (k  1)b)  v( y ) (1/ q) k ,

(a.5)

where v( y)  v( y)  v( y  b). Next, it can be verified that y  z  b  z*  b implies that

K  1  ln 2 / ln q. Hence A(q, K )  0 and therefore J  K  N , by construction of J . It follows
from (weak) concavity of v() and statement (a.1) that
J 1
N K


(a.6) v( y  Jb)  v( y )   v( y  ( j  1)b)  v( y  jb)   v( y ) q N  K 1 ( J  N  K  1)   q j 1  .
j 0
j 0



Statements (a.5) and (a.6) imply that a sufficient condition for (a.2) is
K 1
N K


(1  f ( p)) (1/ q k )  f ( p) q N  K 1 ( J  N  K  1)   q j 1  .
k 0
j 0



(a.7)
N K

K 1

j 0

k 0

Substitute (1  q)  q j 1  q(1  q N  K 1 ), (1  q) q  k  q(q  K  1) and (1  f ( p)) / f ( p)  qg /
in (a.7) to get
(a.8)

1
g

J  N  K  1   (q  q1 K )  q K  q1 N 
.
N

 (1  q)q

To show that inequality (a.8) is indeed satisfied recall that J  N  K  1  A(q, K )q  N by
construction, q  (0,1) by statement (a.ii) and verify that:
g
 1
A(q, K )  q  q1 K  q K   (q  q1 K )  q K  q N 1 
.

 (1  q)

Statement A.2.2 follows from statement A.1.1. Let G > 0 and z  z* be given. Then, as in
part 1, let K be the largest integer smaller than ( z  m) / b . It follows from A(q, K )  0 and

q  (0,1) that there exists N * such that for all integers N  N * , one has
(a.9)

N  K  1  A(q, K )q  N  G / b .

If statement (a.i) is true for some M such that N  (M  m) / b  satisfies (a.9) then one has:
z

{z  ( J 1)b, p; m} {z  G, p; m} ; the first inequality follows from part 1 (A.1.1) whereas the

second one follows from the construction of J and first-order-stochastic dominance.
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Proof of Proposition 1 (expected utility theory) Part a and Part b.i follow directly by linearity in
payoffs of the DU functional (see DU-1) and p=0.5. Condition G  ( z  m) g /

implies that

0  ( z  m) / ( z  m  G)  / ( g  )  1. To show Part b.ii., note that statement (a.ii) is satisfied

and apply part 2 of Proposition A.1 with p = 0.5, f ( p)  p and q  / g to find N such that
statement P.1 for M  m  N ( g  ) implies z {z  G, 0.5; m}, hence Q.1 is not true.

Proof of Corollary 1.1 (rank dependent utility theory) It is an application of Proposition A.1.2
with p = 0.5, f ( p)  h( p) and v( z )   ( z) .

A.2. Proof of Proposition 2 and its Corollaries
General result 2.16 Let preferences over finite discrete lotteries, L  {x j , p j }, j  I m be
represented with utility functional as in statement (NL-1).
(a.iii)

where Pj  Pr( x : x  x j ) and

m 1

Pj

j 1

Pj 1

U ( L)  v( xm ) Pm   v( x j )  df
Pj

 df

 f ( Pj )  f ( Pj 1 ) . Without any loss of generality we use the

Pj 1

normalization, v(0)  0.
Suppose that statement P.2 as stated above Proposition 2 holds; that is for some given
*
y  2 x  0, and positive integers k and n  k * , an agent prefers the following three outcome

lottery to the binary one,
(a.iv)

{ y, pi   ; x, 2 } { y, pi }, for all i {1, 2,

, 2n  k *},

where   1/ 2n and pi  i / 2n  i . Using notation C  v( y) / v( x) and function T () as defined
in section 4.1 we first state and show a general Proposition A.2 for sub-additive value functions
of prizes. Proposition 2 and its Corollaries follow straightforwardly from Proposition A.2.

16

This part of the proof is similar to Sadiraj (2012).
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Proposition A.2. Suppose that statement P.2 is true. Then there exists integer K such that
{z,1  (k *  1) } {zK ,0.5} , for all z  0. The last statement is true for all integers K that do not

exceed T (C, n  k * , n  1).
Proof According to functional (NL-1), statement P.2 (i.e. equation (a.iv)) requires that
( i 1)

v( x)

  df  v( y) f ((i 1) )  v( y) f (i ),

i {1,

, 2n  k *},

( i 1)

for some positive integer k * not larger than n. Adding and subtracting v( x) f (i ) and rearranging
terms in the last inequality we get
( i 1)



i

df  (C  1)

  df ,

i {1,

, 2n  k *}.

( i 1)

i

Write the last inequality for i  k ( 1,

, 2n  k *} and apply it k times to get

( i  k 1)



( i  k )



df  (C  1)

( i 1)

df 

 (C  1)k

( i  k 1)

(i  k )



df ,

i

which generalizes as
( j 1)



(a.10)

( j i 1)

df  (C  1)i



df , j {i,

, 2n  k *}.

( j i )

j

To complete the proof it suffices to show that
n 1

(a.11)

 1 
f (0.5)   

j 0  C  1 

j 0.5



df and f ((2n  k  1) )  f (0.5) 
*

nk*

0.5

 C 1  df

i 0

0.5

i 1

0.5

because two inequalities in (a.11) imply that
n 1
 nk
i 1
j
f ((2n  k  1) )  f (0.5) 1    C  1 /   C  1  .
j 0
 i 0

*

*

Multiplying both sides of the last inequality by v( z ) and using the sub-additivity of v( z ) we get
the needed result:
v( z ) f ((2n  k *  1) )  f (0.5)v( z)T (C, n  k * , n 1)  f (0.5)v( zK ) .

To show the first inequality of (a.11) verify that it follows from inequality (a.10) that
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i

n
 1 
df





i 1 ( i 1)
i 1  C  1 
n

f (0.5)  

n i

n

n 1
 1 
df





j 0  C  1 
( n 1)

j 0.5



df

0.5

Similarly, to show the second inequality of (a.11) verify that

f ((2n  k  1) )  f (0.5) 

2 n  k * 1

*

j

 

j  n 1 ( j 1)

df 

2 n  k * 1

 C  1

j  n 1

j n

0.5



df 

0.5

nk*

 C  1

i 1

i 0

0.5



df

0.5

Proof of Proposition 2 (dual theory of expected utility) Part (a) follows from the linearity in
probabilities of the EU functional (see EU-1). For part (b.i) first note that k *  1 implies
(1  (k *  1) )v( z )  v( z ) ; hence v( z )  0.5v( zG) is a sufficient condition for the inequality in

statement Q.2 to be true. Letting z  1/ G ,17 the last inequality is equivalently written as

v(1/ G)  0.5v(1) which is satisfied for G large enough because the right hand side is a positive
finite number whereas the left hand side approaches 0 when G is large enough. Next, any such
EU agent, with v( y)  2v( x) clearly satisfies pattern P.2 (which follows from part a).
To show part (b.ii) first note that y  2 x  0 imply that T ( y / x, n  k * , n 1) can be as large
as one wants it to be for big enough n. So, for any given G there exists n  N such that
(a.12)

G  T ( y / x, n  k * , n  1).

Then apply Proposition A.2 with v( z )  z to show that P.2 implies {z,1  (k *  1) } {zG,0.5},
for all positive z. Therefore statement Q.2 is not true.
Proof of Corollary 2.1 (zero-income reference-dependent preferences) The proof is similar to the
proof of Proposition 2.b.ii. There is only one difference: use v( z )   ( z) instead of v( z )  z .
Proof of Corollary 2.2 (endogenous reference-dependent preferences) Let the endogenous
reference point be the middle prize, x and let R denote the ratio between the value of the
perceived gain and the absolute value of the perceived loss, that is R   ( y  x) /  ( x)  1 .
Statement P.2 in this case implies

 ( x) f  (1  (i  1) )   (( y  x) f  ((i 1) )   ( x) f  (1  i )   ( y  x) f  (i ), i  I 2nk ,
*

If one is interested in some particular positive t different from 1 that we consider here, then take z  t / G and
verify that the sufficient condition becomes v(t / G)  0.5v(t ), which is satisfied for G large enough.
17
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which can be equivalently rewritten as
( i 1)



1i



df  

i

df  

1 ( i 1)

 ( y  x) i
df  , i  I 2 nk ,
  ( x) (i 1)
*

where the equality follows from f  ( p)  1  f  (1  p) . Use notation R and apply the last
inequality j  i times to get
( j 1)



( i 1)


df  R

j

j i



df  , j {i,

, 2n  k *},

i

and then (as in the proof for the general result 2, Proposition A.2) verify that the following
inequality is true
n 1
 nk

f (1  (k  1) )  f (0.5) 1   R j 1 /  R i  .
i 0
 j 0

*



*



Finally, to complete the proof use the last inequality and sub-additivity of  (), and choose n
such that G  T ( R  1, n  k * , n  1); the existence of such n follows from R  1.
A.3 Contingent Euro Payoff Protocol
The Magdeburg 110 / 100 experiment included amounts x that were as large as 110K euros.
We could credibly offer to pay such large amounts in contingent euros by using the following
protocol. The experiment included two parts. In part 1 subjects made their choices between the
sure amounts and the lotteries in the MAX-Lab at the University of Magdeburg. They were told
that whether their payoffs would be hypothetical or real depended on a condition which would be
described later in part 2. After making their decisions the subjects were informed that real
payoffs were conditional on winning gambles at the Magdeburg Casino. The payoff contingency
was implemented in the following way. For each participant the experimenter placed €90 on the
number 19 on one of the (four American) roulette wheels at the casino. The probability that this
bet wins is 1/38. If the bet wins, it pays 35 to 1. If the first bet won, then the experimenter would
bet all of the winnings on the number 23. If both the first and second bet won, then the payoff
would be €(35  35  90) = €110,250, which would provide enough money to make it feasible
to pay any of the amounts involved in the part 1 decision tasks for that subject. The real payoff
contingency was made credible to the subjects by randomly selecting three of them to
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accompany the experimenter to the casino and subsequently report to the others whether the
experimenter had correctly placed the bets and recorded the outcomes.
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Table 1. Example 1: Varying-Payoffs Calibration Pattern

Row

Option A
{x-100, 0.5; x+110}

Option B
x

1

25 or 235

125

2

235 or 445

335

3

445 or 655

545

…

…

…

t

25+210(t-1) or 25+210t

125+210(t-1)

…

…

…

114

23,755 or 23,965

23,855

115

23,965 or 24,175

24,065

2
Table 2. Example 2: Varying-Probabilities Calibration Pattern
Option A
{30,p; 0}

Row

Option B
{30,p-1/20; 10,2/20; 0}

Payoff 30

Payoff 0

Payoff 30

Payoff 10

Payoff 0

1

1/20

19/20

0/20

2/20

18/20

2

2/20

18/20

1/20

2/20

17/20

...

...

...

...

...

...

10

10/20

10/20

9/20

2/20

9/20

...

...

...

...

...

...

i

i/20

(20-i)/20

(i-1)/20)

2/20

(19-i)/20

...

...

...

...

...

...

18

18/20

2/20

17/20

2/20

1/20

19

19/20

1/20

18/20

2/20

0/20

3

{G* , 0.5;100}
Calibration for
Calibration for
g=90, =50
g=30, =20

Table 3. Calibrations for Varying-Payoffs Patterns: 3, 000
Rejection Intervals
[100, M]

Calibration for
g=110, =100

M
6,000
8,000
10,000
30,000
50,000

G*
6,690
9,913
15,298
0.47  108
0.40  1012

G*
0.22  1013
0.85  1016
0.31  1020
0.10  1057
0.32  1093

G*
0.13  1023
0.14  1030
0.16  1037
0.44  10107
0.12  10178

4

Table 4. Calibrations for Varying-Probabilities Patterns: 1000 {G, 0.5}
Rejection
Calibrated values of G for different values of
Intervals
n
C = 2.5
C=3
C = 3.5
C = 4.0
5
8,593
33,000
98,000
244,000
10
58,665
1,025,000
9,530,000
0.59  108
10
11
3,326,256
0.10  10
20
0.90  10
0.34  1013
12
19
23
50
0.63  10
0.11  10
0.78  10
0.71×1027
21
34
43
100
0.40  10
0.12  10
0.62  10
0.51×1051
39
64
83
0.16  10
0.16  10
200
0.38×10
0.26×1099
92
154
202
0.11  10
0.32  10
500
0.93×10
0.36×10242

n and C
C = 5.0
1,025,000
0.10  1010
0.10  1016
0.12×1034
0.16×1064
0.25×10124
0.10×10305
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Table 5. Choice Alternatives in Varying-Payoffs Experiment Calcutta 30/-20
Row

Option A

Option B

1
2
3
4
5
6

80 or 130
980 or 1,030
1,980 or 2,030
3,980 or 4,030
4,980 or 5,030
5,980 or 6,030

100
1,000
2,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
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Table 6. Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Proportion of Subjects Who Exhibit Patterns P.1 and Predictions (not Q.1) for Payoffs Calibration

Experiment

Calcutta 90/-50
m = 50

Nr. of
subjects

40

Model I

0.82**
(0.70,0.94)
M=5,000: 1000 ⧽ {0.32x1011, 0.5; 50}

Calcutta 30/-20
m = 100

Magdeburg 110/-100
m = 3000

30

41

0.43**
(0.25,0.62)
M=6,000: 1,000 ⧽ {0.13x1023, 0.5; 100}

Model II

0.81**
(0.69,0.93)
M=4,000: 1,000 ⧽ {0.53x109, 0.5; 50}
0.48**
(0.30,0.66)
M=5,000: 1,000 ⧽ {0.40x1019, 0.5; 100}

Model III

0.81**
(0.69,0.93)
M=3,000: 1,000 ⧽ {0.86x107, 0.5; 50}
0.48**
(0.30,0.67)
M=4,000: 1,000 ⧽ {0.12 x1016, 0.5;100}

0.54**
(0.39,0.68)

0.54**
(0.39,0.68)

0.54**
(0.36,0.71)

M = 110,000:5,000⧽{0.12x1023, 0.5;3,000}

M=90,000:5,000⧽{0.14x1019,0.5;3,000}

M=70,000:5,000 ⧽ {0.17x1015, 0.5;3,000}

7

Table 7. Choice Alternatives in Varying-Probabilities Experiment Atlanta 14/4

Row
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Option A
Payoff 14
1/10
2/10
3/10
4/10
5/10
6/10
7/10
8/10
9/10

Payoff 0
9/10
8/10
7/10
6/10
5/10
4/10
3/10
2/10
1/10

Option B
Payoff 14
0/10
1/10
2/10
3/10
4/10
5/10
6/10
7/10
8/10

Payoff 4
2/10
2/10
2/10
2/10
2/10
2/10
2/10
2/10
2/10

Payoff 0
8/10
7/10
6/10
5/10
4/10
3/10
2/10
1/10
0/10

7
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Table 8. Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Proportion of Subjects Who Exhibit Patterns P.2 and Predictions (not Q.2) for Probabilities Calibration
Experiment

Atlanta
14/4

Atlanta
40/10

Nr. Of
Subjects
39
POR

Model I

Model II

Model III

0.74**
(0.55,0.93)

0.82**
(0.68,0.96)

0.88**
(0.77,0.99)

34
PAC/9

0.81**
(0.61,1.0)

0.90**
(0.76,1.0)

0.93**
(0.81,1.0)

22
POR

1000 ⧽ {98000, 0.5;0}
0.56**
(0.37,0.75)

1000 ⧽ {39000, 0.5;0}
0.59**
(0.39,0.78)

1000 ⧽ {15700, 0.5;0}
0.59**
(0.40,0.79)

35
PAC/9

0.76**
(0.56,0.95)

0.83**
(0.66,1.0)

0.93**
(0.85,1.0)

1000 ⧽ {244000, 0.5;0}

1000 ⧽ {81000, 0.5;0}

1000 ⧽ {27000, 0.5;0}

0.65**
(0.49, 0.81)

0.67**
(0.51, 0.83)

0.71**
(0.56, 0.87)

1000 ⧽ {244000, 0.5;0}
0.72**
(0.58,0.86)

1000 ⧽ {81000, 0.5;0}
0.72**
(0.58,0.86)

1000 ⧽ {27000, 0.5;0}
0.73**
(0.59,0.86)

1000 ⧽ {1 million, 0.5;0}

1000 ⧽ {256000, 0.5;0}

1000 ⧽ {64000, 0.5;0}

Magdeburg
40/10

31
POR

Calcutta
400/80

40
POR
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